

The Partisanship of House Committees and Member Self-Selection*

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Abstract

The extant literature suggests that members choose committees for distributive reasons and seek more prestigious committees as they move up the seniority ranks. But why do some members chose committees like Rules and Judiciary which are not distributive in nature? I claim that committees also offer representational benefits: namely, the ability to signal ideological preferences to constituents. Members from moderate districts seek out committees with jurisdictions over consensual issues, while members from extreme districts prefer committees with highly partisan jurisdictions. Using a unique dataset of committee partisanship constructed from committee roll call votes, I show that members are more likely to select ideologically congruent committees, and more likely to leave non-congruent committees, though this relationship is conditioned by the distributive value of the committee. This research has implications for committee selection and theories of legislative organization by demonstrating that committees offer ideological representation benefits as well as distributive ones.

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Standing congressional committees and their memberships remain at the center of legislative action in Congress, with responsibility for writing legislation, conducting oversight of the executive branch, and processing jurisdictional issues that move onto the congressional agenda. Members view their committee assignments as central to their legislative brand and reelection prospects, and seek out the most favorable assignments. For example, after the 2018 congressional elections the Congressional Progressive Caucus threatened to withhold support for Nancy Pelosi's speakership bid unless she guaranteed members of the caucus seats on many of the "exclusive" committees, including Ways and Means, Intelligence, and Financial Services.¹

A significant body of research examines how members choose committees, and how well those choices reflect empirical predictions made by different theories of congressional organization. Distributive theory offers the most cogent explanation of committee self-selection, claiming members prefer committees that allow them to direct particularized benefits to their districts, thus increasing reelection prospects. There are two puzzling aspects of the theory: first, the vast majority of committee seats are for non-distributive jurisdictions, and second, service on many of these non-distributive committees is highly valued by members (e.g., Foreign Affairs, Rules). If members see reelection as their primary imperative and Congress is organized around distributive principles, why have so many non-distributive committees developed, and why are seats on them sought after?

Scholars argue that all committees have hidden distributive benefits, or that members value policy oriented or prestige committees because they allow them to influence non-distributive (i.e., national rather than district-level) policy outcomes, or increase their personal status within the chamber. However, evidence that distributive committees help members achieve electoral goals is thin, and there is virtually no evidence for hidden distributive benefits from policy or prestige oriented committees. Similarly, while helping to produce national policy outcomes (as opposed to serving particularized goals) or increasing personal prestige is certainly an important goal of members, these factors have not been shown to help members win reelection.

The theory presented here relies on individual electoral incentives, and claims that committee service offers members an opportunity to build their ideological credentials (i.e., moderate or extreme) in order to appeal to their constituents. Legislators who represent moderate districts prefer to sit on bipartisan committees, and members who represent extreme districts prefer

¹See, "Jayapal and Pocan Release Statement on Meeting with Nancy Pelosi." Pramila Jayapal Press Release, November 15, 2018. Accessed at: <https://jayapal.house.gov/media/press-releases/jayapal-and-pocan-statement-meeting-leader-pelosi> on November 22, 2018.

to serve on partisan committees. Aligning committee service with district preferences allows members to engage in dyadic representation, communicate their preferences, and avoid electoral sanctions from constituents. These claims complement recent literature demonstrating that members' carefully manage their voting record, bill sponsorship activities, public statements, and other legislative activities to ensure consistency with the preferences of their constituents. The electoral or representation based incentives described here inform both partisan and informational theories which largely focus on collective committee composition strategies (by either the party leadership or chamber pivot) but have little to say about members' own committee preferences. Committees can be constructed to reflect the preferences of either the party leadership or chamber pivot, while also offering an individual-level benefit to members.

I measure the most important aspect of committee action, the development of legislation, using a unique dataset of all roll call votes taken within House standing committees from the 104th through 114th Congresses, I create a measure of each committee's partisanship within each congress, and use it to determine whether members from more ideologically moderate (extreme) districts self-select onto committees which are more bipartisan (partisan). Committees offer a unique opportunity within Congress for members to convey ideological/partisan preferences because committee activity involves legislative stakes rather than rhetorical ones (as compared to activities like floor speeches). Further, members of the minority can demonstrate their preferences as committee rules empower them to a greater degree than on the chamber floor.²

This research yields four findings. The first descriptive result is that standing House committees vary in their latent level of partisanship, and their relative level of partisanship exhibits only limited variation.³ Second, members serve on committees which have a level of partisanship congruent with their district's ideological extremity; third, members are more likely to leave a committee if its level of partisanship does not match their district's ideological extremity; fourth, committees which are *both* distributive and ideologically congruent are the most sought after assignments for members. Committee partisanship is a valuable component of member self-selection behavior and offers an explanation for the creation and usefulness of

²Agenda setting by the majority occurs within committees as the chair can largely determine which bills to address, but standing committee rules allow the minority to force a a recorded roll call vote on agreement from only 1/5 of members.

³Relative level of partisanship means as compared to other committees. The absolute level of partisanship over time for a given committee varies as member ideology and institutional polarization vary.

non-distributive committees.

Existing Theories of Committee Self-Selection and Electoral Incentives

While each of the three theories of legislative organization offers competing claims about the purpose and composition of committees, I focus on demand-side preferences of committee assignments. That is, why do members seek out certain committee assignments? While all three theories begin with the premise that committees serve the reelection imperative of individual members by helping organize collective action and effect policy change, only distributive theory explicitly theorizes how self-selection assists individual electoral goals. Both partisan and information theories largely ignore member incentives, though they do offer explanations of collective committee purposes (i.e., develop partisan legislation or bills favorable to the chamber pivotal actor.) The theory here, based on individual representation incentives, offers an explanation of how members derive individual, non-distributive benefits from committee service (though I do not adjudicate between partisan and information-based theories).

Distributive theory claims that legislators seek to provide benefits to their constituents, which are heterogeneous across districts (Weingast & Marshall 1988). Legislators are “high demanders” with outlying preferences on policy issues, congruent with the outlying preferences of their district. Committee service allows lawmakers to distribute economic benefits (e.g., funding for infrastructure, tax breaks for local business interests), rather than espouse ideological positions (Rundquist & Ferejohn 1975). They ensure the provision of particularized goods with majority support through log-rolls across jurisdictional areas (Shepsle & Weingast 1981, Weingast, Shepsle & Johnsen 1981). Thus, members have strong incentives to seek out committees which allow them to provide particularistic goods to their constituents, enhancing their reelection prospects as voters reward incumbents for addressing jurisdictional issues of disproportionate interest to the district (Bickers & Stein 1996, Lazarus 2010, Law & Tonon 2006).

Evidence on whether committee service is consistent with district characteristics is mixed (Adler 2000, Adler & Lapinski 1997, Frisch & Kelly 2004, Shepsle 1978), as is the evidence that service on even classically distributive committees like Appropriations allows for the provision particularized goods at a greater level than other comparable members (Berry & Fowler 2016, Lazarus 2010).

Information theory claims that committees are agents of the chamber median, and serve as information providers (Krehbiel 1991).⁴ The median has final say over which members serve on which committees, delegates information processing to them, and then selects the utility maximizing policy. Consistent with House rules which require the slate of committee appointments to be approved by the chamber, committees' collective preferences are theorized to be representative of the chamber's policy preferences (Groseclose 1994*b*, Groseclose 1994*a*, Krehbiel 1990).

The theory has trouble explaining why members self-select onto certain committees, or why some committees are more valuable than others; if individual members are not able to extract benefits from their service, why is any particular committee more electorally useful than any other committee? Members should be indifferent with respect to their assignment and there should be no consistently "valuable" committees given that a particular committee assignment is electorally unimportant to an individual member.

Like information theory, party-based claims focus largely on the collective incentives for parties to assign certain members to certain committees, what Maltzman (1997) calls, "hiring the right agent.[41]" For being a good party actor, an individual member may be rewarded with their preferred committee assignment. But, partisan theories largely do not explain where these demand-side preferences come from. Instead, they emphasize the role of top-down selection by the parties, in which members have little agency in choosing their assignment (Young & Heitshusen 2003). The parties rely on committees as agenda-control and legislative development tools and their involvement is limited to producing legislation favored by the party and keeping disfavored agenda items off the floor where they might "roll" the majority party (Cox & McCubbins 2005). If the leadership largely determines the content of legislation and which bills receive floor action, members simply carry out orders.

Though both information and partisan theories imply that individual members can extract benefits from their preferred committee assignment, these claims have not been explicitly theorized or tested. Distributive theory makes the most explicit claims regarding committee self-selection, but most committees are not distributive in nature. Further, empirical evidence on committee valuation by legislators shows that many of these non-distributive committees are among the most sought after, including Rules, Foreign Affairs, and House Administration. If

⁴The theory can easily be extended to chambers with institutional rules that empower a member other than the median, such as in the Senate where the filibuster pivot (3/5 member) is decisive.

these committees do not aid members' reelection chances, what incentive exists for service on these committees? I claim members seek out committees for representation reasons, which allows them to extract individual benefits from their committee service while also serving the collective goals promoted by party leaders or the median.

Other recent explanations of committee self-selection focus on prestige or idiosyncratic member interest (Frisch & Kelly 2004, Frisch & Kelly 2006). Perhaps by specializing in an issue area where demand for legislator interest exceeds supply, reelection goals are indirectly helped by increasing the public profile of the lawmaker. While it is clearly the case that members enter Congress with different backgrounds and have different levels of *a priori* interest in different issue areas (Fenno 1978), reasons for self-selection such as personal issue attachment do not connect to theories of legislative organization and there is very little evidence that prestige increases electoral prospects. The selection of committees which are congruent with a district's partisanship allows members to both engage in policy areas of interest while also serving the electoral connection.

Lawmaker Behavior and Representation Incentives

Elections play a central role in democratic theory as the mechanism which ensures legislators represent the interests of voters. In Congress, the observed ideologies of members reflect the ideological or partisan makeup of their district (Abramowitz, Alexander & Gunning 2006, McCarty, Poole & Rosenthal 2009), and the "electoral connection" explains a wide range of other behavior within the chambers, such as position-taking, voting, bill sponsorship and co-sponsorship, and the distribution of district-level goods (Harbridge 2015, Jessee 2009, Mayhew 1974, Shepsle & Weingast 1987).

There have been a variety of mechanisms proposed to explain how voters constrain elected officials despite low sophistication (e.g., Lau & Redlawsk 1997, Lupia 1994, Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002, Wittman 1989), but importantly, elected officials *believe* that voters care about the positions and actions they take (Box-Steffensmeier, Ryan & Sokhey 2015, Fenno 1978, Jones 2011, Kingdon 1989, Mayhew 1974). As a result, members seek to build ideological records (Arnold 1990) and signal partisanship to constituents (Grimmer 2013). Committee service is one of the most important ways members' promote their "home style," and demonstrate effective representation of their voters' preferences (Fenno 1973, Fenno 1978). Further,

voters' inability to constrain elected officials is overstated; voters can identify their representatives' ideological and partisan positions (Peskowitz 2017), and reputation and vote share of legislators decline as they move away from the preferences of their constituents (Ansolabehere, Snyder & Stewart 2001, Binder, Maltzman & Sigelman 1998, Canes-Wrone, Brady & Cogan 2002, Erikson 1990, Jessee 2009, Shor & Rogowski 2018).

Committee Service as Representation

There is little theoretical or empirical work connecting committee service to dyadic ideological or partisan representation, despite the importance of these two factors on other congressional activities, such as roll call voting, and on structuring voters' choices (Downs 1957, Schaffner & Streb 2002). I claim the legislative development and oversight work conducted within standing committees assists members with reelection by offering an opportunity to convey ideological and partisan preferences to their constituents (Fowler, Douglass & Clark 1980, Grimmer & Powell 2013, though see Berry & Fowler 2018 for a contrasting view). Members convey the nature of their committee behavior through the same mechanisms they use to convey other aspects of their representative behavior: public appeals, campaigns, mailers, etc. Interest groups also pay close attention to committee activity and serve as information providers to voters. For example, on March 1, 2020, Buddy Carter (R-GA) mentioned coronavirus related activities undertaken by the Health Subcommittee of the Energy and Commerce Committee four times in an e-newsletter to constituent (Cormack 2017). Similarly, in early 2019, Speaker Pelosi expressed concern about member loyalty on committee votes, which forced other members of the caucus to take "tough votes in committee."⁵ Clearly, members are sensitive about the representational consequences of their committee activities.

Thus, a necessary first condition of the theory is that committees vary in their latent level of partisanship, just as some issue areas within the chamber are more partisan or polarized than others (Jochim & Jones 2012). That some committees deal with more partisan jurisdictions than others is widely recognized (Bendix 2016, Carson, Finocchiaro & Rohde 2010, Evans 1991), but I create a set of empirical measures based on voting behavior within committees to quantify the extent to which committee activity divides along party lines within the jurisdiction.

⁵Caygle, Heather, John Bresnahan, and Sarah Ferris. "House Democrats weigh rules change after GOP floor victory." Politico.com, Accessed at www.politico.com/story/2019/02/27/house-rules-change-democrats-1194626?fbclid=IwAR17D7dVFFBH6uVezTF3G4GXubL08wwhVxVHK15i4INeZdW4g4eJINjAyfQ on May 22, 2019.

Proposition 1 reflects this descriptive claim.

Proposition 1: House standing committees vary in their latent level of partisanship.

Variation in committee partisanship allows members to engage in behavior that matches the ideological orientation of their constituents. Members who represent ideologically extreme constituencies prefer to work in committee jurisdictional areas that are also highly partisan so that the member can credit claim for conflicting with the other party and pursuing ideologically extreme policy outcomes preferred by their voters. This builds their reputation among their constituents similar to other behavior within the chamber (e.g., floor roll call voting, floor speeches).

Congressional districts are conceptualized as being ideologically moderate or extreme, where moderate districts are those that have a median voter who lies close to the ideological center of the national political spectrum. Ideology is a continuous theoretical concept, a function of the collective preferences of voters within a district, measured here using vote shares for the two major parties, a common method of capturing district ideology (Carson & Engstrom 2005, Erikson & Wright 1980, Kernell 2009).

Congressional representatives make dichotomous voting decisions that manifest as partisan divisions, which are highly correlated with ideology. I claim that in the modern Congress, district ideology maps onto legislator partisanship in that voters in more ideologically extreme districts prefer a legislator who is more partisan. Thus, I refer to members as representing ideologically moderate or extreme districts and serving on committees which are partisan or bipartisan, consistent with the extant literature (Ansolabehere, Snyder & Stewart 2001, Canes-Wrone, Brady & Cogan 2002, Engstrom & Kernell 2005, Kernell 2009).⁶ Committee service is *congruent* when members serve on committees which have a level of partisanship similar to the ideological moderation or extremity of their district.

A Theory of Ideological and Partisan Alignment in Committee Service

In first-past-the-post, single-member district representation, the median is decisive and thus the voter the legislator needs to satisfy in order to win reelection. Assume the district median

⁶I am interested in the extent to which committees are more or less partisan, rather than whether they are liberal or conservative. More partisan committees will have members who are very liberal or conservative as compared to bipartisan committees, which will have members who are moderate. I am also not concerned with the extent to which committees represent the chamber, in either a distributive or ideological sense, though this presents an interesting avenue for future research (see McGrath and Ryan 2019, and Richman 2008 for recent summaries of this literature.).

voter is of one of two types: moderate or extreme. A representative observes the median voter type through an election, (which by definition, the representative has won). The median voter is not strategic about revealing their type because they always receive a higher payoff from the legislator matching it through their representation style once in Congress. Additionally, assume each committee is of either the moderate or extreme partisan type, and a lawmaker chooses the type on which to serve. Committee types are a function of the latent level of partisanship in a particular committee's jurisdictional area due to the bills and oversight activities addressed.

Committee service increases the probability of reelection, though not all committees are equally effective in promoting a representative to their constituents. All else equal, the representative's probability of being reelected increases if they serve on a committee which matches the type of their district median. Thus, members from moderate districts will secure greater electoral benefits if they serve on a moderate committee. Holding other committee characteristics constant (e.g., distributive benefits, importance, etc.), there is no clear theoretical reason as to why a member would prefer to serve on a non-matched committee given that the extant literature suggests voters care about their members' partisan behavior within the institution and prefer it match their own preferences.

As is well established, committees also have distributive benefits that increase the probability of reelection, though again, there is variation in the extent to which committees produces distributive benefits. Taken together, members prefer to serve on a committee that has a level of partisanship congruent with their district's ideological extremity *and* produces distributive benefits. A lawmaker may prefer a committee with a level of partisanship that is not congruent with their district's ideology if the distributive benefits of the committee are sufficiently high. That is, the electoral loss a member suffers from serving on a non-matched committee may be compensated by increased distributive benefits from the alternative committee assignment. To generalize, as the extent to which a member is not well matched to their committee increases, the greater the extent to which the committee must provide distributive benefits that enhance their reelection prospects.

Empirical Expectations of Committee Selection

The theory first predicts that, holding all other factors constant, including distributive benefits, legislators select committees with partisanship levels similar to their district ideology.

That is, members representing ideologically extreme (moderate) districts should serve on partisan (bipartisan) committees.

Hypothesis 1: As the ideological extremity of a member's district increases, the committee(s) on which a member serves will be increasingly partisan.

Distributive benefits also play an important role in selection as they add to the total electoral payoff received from committee service. If a lawmaker receives substantial benefits from serving on a valuable distributive committee they are more likely to serve on an ideologically incongruent committee, though as the theory demonstrates, the best possible committee assignment is one in which the committee offers distributive benefits *and* has a level of partisanship congruent with the ideological makeup of a member's district. Conversely, when a committee has low distributive benefits, the probability of selecting the committee will be low, but positively conditioned by level of congruence.

Hypothesis 2: Members are more likely to serve on a distributive committee and the effect is positively conditioned by an increase in ideological and partisan congruence between a member's district and committee partisanship.

The Conditional Effect of Ideological/Partisan Alignment on Committee Departure

House members do not always receive their preferred assignments because they are doled out by seniority and sought-after committee seats are limited (Goodwin 1959, Kellermann & Shepsle 2009). As a result, members may have an incentive to depart their current committee and join another, but switching committees is not costless; members lose their seniority which can affect their reelection prospects (Grosseclose & Stewart 1998). Committee departures demonstrate revealed preferences about which committee assignments maximize legislators' utility received from ideological congruence and distributive benefits. If members care about the ideological implications of their committee service, there will be evidence they change committees for greater district-committee congruence.⁷

Assume a member serves on a committee on which they are not well suited ideologically (i.e., a member from an ideologically moderate district serves on a partisan committee, or vice versa). If they switch, they suffer costs, so the payoff from switching and serving on a matched

⁷Ideally, the empirical analyses would include committee request data; however, the request data collected by Frisch and Kelly (2007) end at the 103rd Congress and do not overlap with the data here (104th-114th Congress). Examining committee departures is an indirect way of examining members who may not serve on their preferred committee.

committee is the difference between the electoral benefits on the new committee and the old committee, minus the costs of switching. Thus, switching should occur if the electoral benefits from congruence on the new committee are much higher, or if the change in distributive benefits received from switching are very high.⁸

I expect these dynamics to be most acute for members who represent competitive districts, as they are most sensitive to being out of alignment with their district. For members already likely to be reelected, the electoral benefits gained from switching from a non-congruent committee to a more congruent one are likely to be small, thus making them unwilling to bear the costs of switching. For members in a more tenuous position, switching between committees can produce dramatic increases in the probability of reelection and makes them more willing to switch.

I proxy for the district level of competitiveness in the general election by using presidential vote share in the previous election within the member's district. Members from closely divided partisan districts are at greater risk of losing their seat, and if they are also not well-matched, are more likely to depart their committee.

Hypothesis 3: Members in competitive seats are more likely to switch to a committee with a level of partisanship that is congruent with their district ideology.

I focus on competitive seats as defined by the overall ideology of the district. As a secondary consideration, I also briefly consider whether members in safe general election districts are concerned about being "primaried" by a member of the same party if they are out of step with other party members on the same committee with respect to partisanship. It might be the case that members in non-competitive general election seats are less sensitive to overall committee congruence but more sensitive to congruence with their own party members, though importantly, overall committee partisanship should also be reflected in the makeup of both party delegations on the committee. Or, perhaps members from extreme seats prefer to be committee outliers, though it is not clear why if that were the case they would not seek out a more partisan committee.

The last empirical implication of the theory is that the level of distributive benefits offered by a committee will incentivize a member to remain on a non-matched committee. When a

⁸The claims here are consistent with the intuition used to capture committee values in that committees receive a higher relative value not just when a member switches onto the committee, but when the value of the committee the member leaves is also high. In short, a committee is more valuable when a member leaves another high value committee to join it (Groseclose & Stewart 1998, Munger 1988).

committee is not distributive, members should be more willing to move as ideological and partisan incongruence increases. The reverse is also true: when a committee has a high distributive component, members will be less likely to leave the committee, even as incongruence increases, because they are unlikely to improve on their total utility on a new committee. As before, members with tenuous reelection prospects will be more sensitive to changes produced by

Hypothesis 4: Members in competitive seats are more likely to switch to a distributive committee, and this relationship is positively conditioned by the level of ideological and partisan congruence.

Hypotheses 1 and 2 articulate empirical expectations about committee selections made by members, given the constraints of the seniority system and limited seats for the most plum assignments, while hypotheses 3 and 4 are empirical expectations about leaving committees, which partially accounts for these constraints. Ideally, the data would allow for direct comparisons between committee dyads, such that differences could be calculated between committees which members depart and join. This is not possible because members view committee assignments as a portfolio, and leave or join committees in order to improve the overall portfolio value. Trading multiple committee seats for multiple alternative committees is common, as is exchanging multiple committee assignments for fewer (but presumably better) assignments. Because members are making implicit comparisons between multiple seats at a time, I cannot empirically model committee dyads in which a member leaves one committee and joins the another. Instead, the approach taken above separately models overall committee selection and committee departures at the member-committee level.

Measuring Committee Partisanship and Data Considerations

Committee partisanship is measured using all roll call votes taken within all House standing committees, 104th-114th Congresses (1995 to 2017). Roll call voting records are commonly used to measure levels of partisanship or ideology for elected officials as votes are generally considered to be an observable expression of sincere preferences (Groseclose & Milyo 2010, Poole & Rosenthal 1997). Further, compared to votes taken on the House floor, the sample of issues on which votes are taken is less censored because the minority party and individual members have a greater ability to force votes during the consideration of legislation.

All votes taken in standing committees such as those on amendments, motions, and to report the bill, are incorporated into three measures of partisanship. While patterns of partisanship differ on each of these types (for example, most of the majority votes to report a bill, while amendment votes are dominated by minority party support as they try to modify the bill in a way more favorable to their preferences or roll the majority party), the measures here capture the level of partisanship of the committee as a whole. Unfortunately, due to various limitations within committee reports, data is not available prior to the 104th Congress. Additional details on the process of collecting committee votes from committee reports for the 104th-114th Congress can be found in (ANONYMIZED, Forthcoming *Legislative Studies Quarterly*).

The sample period coincides with higher partisanship within the chamber, institutional changes as the result of the “Gingrich Revolution” at the start of the 104th Congress, and the declining importance of the distribution of particularized goods that characterized the post-war “textbook” Congress (Aldrich & Rohde 2000). The focus here is on the role of partisanship in recent congresses and the conditioning effect of distributive committee benefits. Due to space limitations, I cannot fully explore the implications for Congress historically, but even in eras with low partisanship (e.g., the post-war era), some issue areas were more partisan than others and parties still influenced many chamber voting decisions. The theory is expected to hold across time, though the strength of the relationship between district extremity and committee partisanship likely varies. Due to high levels of polarization and voter partisanship, the relationship is likely more pronounced in the recent congressional terms included in the sample.

The measure used in the main analyses is the average absolute difference between the percentage of Democrats voting “yea” minus the percentage of Republicans voting “yea” on a given vote. A value of zero indicates that the same percentage of Democrats and Republicans voted “yea” across all votes, while a value of 100 indicates that all members of one party voted against all members of the other party. Consistent with previous research, the percentage voting in favor for a given vote is found by dividing the number of voters voting yes by the total number of voting members (Krehbiel 1998).⁹ The measure is equal to:

⁹Bernie Sanders is coded as a Democrat despite identifying as an independent. There are no other independents in the dataset.

$$\text{Average party difference for committee } j \text{ in congress } k = \frac{\sum(|\text{Democratic percentage voting yea} - \text{Republican Percentage voting yea}|)_{\text{vote } i}}{\text{number of votes in committee } j \text{ in congress } k} \quad (1)$$

Two other measures used for robustness checks are related to party line voting, where greater than 50% of Democrats or Republicans voted against 50% of members of the other party are deemed “low party votes,” while votes where greater than 95% of members of each party opposed the other party are deemed “high party votes.” These threshold are admittedly arbitrary, though a 50% threshold has commonly been used to define party line votes (Brady, Cooper & Hurley 1979, Hurley & Wilson 1989, Kerr 2000, Sinclair 1977), and the results are insensitive to the threshold (i.e., estimates using a 50%, 75%, 90%, or 95% threshold are not substantively different from each other).

Each of these measures is calculated at the vote level then averaged at the committee-congress level resulting in a percentage of low party votes (50% threshold), high party votes (95% threshold), and the average party difference for each committee within each congress. The result is 197 observations (there are 20 committees in 11 congresses for a possible total of 220 observations, but not every committee has a recorded roll call vote for a given congress).

As shown in Appendix Table A1, there is significant variation in the level of committee partisanship. For example, on average, there is a 54% party difference in Agriculture votes, while there is a 94% party difference in voting on the Rules Committee (equivalent to 100% of one party voting yes and only 6% of the other party voting yes, on average). These patterns are reflected in the data on party line votes as well with, for example, only about 46% of votes on Intelligence qualifying as a low party vote (majorities of each party voting in opposition to the other party), while more than 97% of votes on Rules qualify as a low party vote. Intelligence is an unusual committee in that the party leaders have total control over the committee’s roster and required to select members also assigned to Judiciary, Foreign Relations, Appropriations, and Armed Services (DeVine 2018). For these reasons, I also ran all models omitting Intelligence, and the substantive results remain (results now shown but code provided in replication file).¹⁰

¹⁰Interestingly, Politico reported in 2018 that members were “clamoring” to serve on Intelligence because of the upcoming partisan battle over Russia’s interference in the 2016 election. See “Lawmakers clamor for piece of Trump action on House Intel,” Politico.com, October 15, 2018. Accessed at: <https://www.politico.com/story/2018/10/15/house-intelligence-committee-trump-889155> on July 20, 2020.

The empirical models measure committee partisanship within each Congress but the theoretical expectations require that legislators have beliefs about each committee's partisanship, and that it should be relatively stable across congresses. Appendix Table A2 shows the rank ordering of committees across all congresses, which is in line with expectations, with policy committees generally being more partisan than distributive committees (Carson, Finocchiaro & Rohde 2010). While there is variation across congresses, relative partisan committee ranks are largely consistent across time. The standard deviation of each committees ranking within the distribution. The average standard deviation of partisan rankings across all committees is 3.8, the smallest is 1.69 (Education and the Workforce) the highest is about 6 (Budget). I also calculated the range for each committee, or the maximum difference between its rankings across the eleven congresses. The average range for all committees was 11, meaning that on average, the maximum difference between committee ranks lie in the same half of the distribution. Finally, if members are not able to anticipate committee partisanship, selection will be based on other factors, and the empirical results will be biased downward. I leave theorizing about the causes of variation in partisanship within committees to future research, but it is likely tied to exogenous events, reauthorizations of large bills (e.g., Transportation, Agriculture), and how the majority party and its leadership choose to use different committees.

The data is limited in that it only captures roll call votes within committees, and a significant quantity of committee activity is not voted on. Voice votes, unanimous consent votes, and division votes are recorded inconsistently by committees and over time, and as a result are not included here. Though the committee ranking has strong face validity, some committees stand out. For example, House Administration is commonly thought of as bipartisan given its jurisdictional focuses on federal elections and internal House operations. The roll call voting patterns within the committee reveal that the markup of legislation is quite partisan, however. As one recent example, in the 116th Congress the committee reported H.R. 4617, a bill that “generally limits political spending and election interference by foreign entities,”¹¹ The bill was seen as a response to actions taken by Russia during the 2016 presidential election, but was also highly partisan. In committee, eight roll call votes were taken on the bill, and none of them featured any cross-party voting. On passage in the House, only one Democrat voted against the bill, and no Republicans voted in favor.

¹¹Language from the bill summary authored by the Congressional Research Service. Accessed at: <https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/4617> on November 20, 2019.

Just as in examining house floor votes, only relatively partisan items are recorded in the data, while highly consensual actions will be completed via voice vote or unanimous consent. This problem is expected to be less acute than on floor voting because the threshold to call for a recorded vote in committee is low. Further, the relevant comparisons in the analyses are *between* committees and if the data generation process for votes is similar across committees, then the results are not driven by committee-specific selection mechanisms. A few committees have a relatively small number of votes (Veteran’s Affairs and Small Business), but I re-estimate all empirical models excluding these committees and the results do not substantively change (results not shown but code provided in replication file). Even when a unique characteristic of a committee, such as having a partisan chair, an aggressive member who calls for lots of votes, etc. affects what legislative items receive votes, the empirical models measuring the relationship between district and committee characteristics control for both time-level and committee-level effects, holding baseline differences within these levels constant.

I am most interested in the substantive development of legislation, which is subject to recorded votes. Consensual activities that are not represented by votes are also not as visible to constituents, and therefore less meaningful to House members when engaging in different representation styles. Still, it must be acknowledged, similar to research on chamber roll call votes, that the data may overstate the degree of partisanship within committees.

Additional Evidence for Jurisdictional Variation in Committee Partisanship

As a robustness check for the claim that the innate partisanship of committee jurisdictions vary, I calculate the same measure of partisanship, the average difference in partisan voting, for each committee’s membership for votes taken on the House floor. This establishes a common set of votes for all committee memberships, or a baseline level of partisanship for a given congressional term. Next, I compare the partisanship of each committee membership in floor voting to partisanship in committee voting. Figures A1-A4 in Appendix B show the results of this comparison. Each figure shows one congress, with each committee ordered on the x-axis from least to most partisan in committee voting. The bars show the *difference* in committee voting partisanship from floor voting partisanship for each committee membership. Thus, for each committee, the collective partisanship of the same set of members voting within the committee is compared to their collective partisanship voting on the floor.

As the bar graphs show, in the most bipartisan committees, voting patterns are more biparti-

san as compared to the committee membership's voting on the floor, while in the most partisan committees, voting is much more partisan as compared to the membership's voting on the floor. That is, bipartisan committees are less partisan compared to the baseline level of partisanship for the congress, while partisan committees are more partisan compared to the baseline level of partisanship. This pattern provides additional evidence that committee jurisdictional variation is not an artifact of the measurement strategy. See Appendix B for more details.

Model Parameters and Specifications

The dependent variable used in the first set of analyses is committee selection from a constrained choice set. Models of binary choice (i.e., logit) predict the effect of a variable on the probability of selecting an outcome for all observations across the sample, but here I am interested in the selection of a particular committee assignment from a large set (approximately 20) of possible choices. Conditional logit is the preferred estimation method for these data structures (McFadden 1973), which is equivalent to fixed effects logit, where intercepts, along with covariates, are estimated for the possible selection groups (here, committees).¹² I estimate fixed effects logit (rather than conditional logit) because calculating marginal effects from conditional logit models can be misleading as all fixed effects must equal zero (Beck 2015).

A member's own voting record contributes to the committee's lagged partisanship if the member served on the committee in a previous term. The result is that a committee's lagged partisanship is a function of a member's partisanship, and theoretically, members likely evaluate the partisanship of a committee independent of their own behavior. That is, members make committee choice decisions at time t based on the partisanship of the committee at time $t - 1$, bracketing their contribution to the committee's partisanship. To deal with this issue, in the empirical models, committee partisanship for member i is calculated excluding each member's own contribution to the committee's partisanship.

District partisanship, one of the key independent variables, operationalizes the member's constituent preferences, and is measured using both the district's difference from presidential vote share in the most recent presidential election and Kernell's (2009) modified measure of presidential vote share for districts. Using the difference between the district's presidential vote

¹²One difference between the conditional logit estimator and the logit fixed effects estimator is that the intercept in conditional logit is not estimated because it is constant across groups. This does not affect the estimated coefficients. The fixed effects logit model here estimates with a few more observations than the conditional logit, and as a result the coefficients differ slightly.

share and the national vote share is a common way of measuring district ideology as it offers a direct expression of voting behavior, and is comparable across time and districts, though it only varies every four years (Carson & Engstrom 2005, Carson, Engstrom & Roberts 2006, Erikson & Wright 1980). Kernell's (2009) measure uses multiple election returns to estimate the distribution of voter ideologies within a district. I find the absolute value of both measures, with higher values indicating more ideologically extreme districts. A number of districts are ideological outliers and both district ideological extremity measures have significantly higher mean values than medians. To account for this, I take the natural log of each and model fit statistics indicate the logged variables outperform the unmodified variables, though the results are robust to non-logged specifications.

The dependent variables used in the second set of analyses measure whether a member departed a committee at the end of a congressional term. If a member left Congress within the sample, leaving a committee is coded as missing because whether that member would have left the committee is unobserved.¹³

The extent to which a legislator is congruent with the extremity of the committee is measured by creating z-scores of the Kernell and presidential vote district measures for all members on committee j in congress k , then taking the absolute value. The variable is constructed such that members who lie exactly at the committee mean in district ideology have scores of zero, while those who are outliers with either more moderate or extreme districts than the committee mean have high values.

The theory also claims that committee departure is conditional on the extent to which the legislator is concerned about their electoral prospects. This concept is measured through the two district partisanship measures as there is a substantial literature demonstrating that members in more bipartisan districts are more cross-pressured, are at greater risk of losing their seat, and pay closer attention to constituent preferences (Sullivan & Uslander 1978). I also use the legislator's vote percentage received in the most recent election as an indicator of electoral security.

A set of control variables for members are included in the models, including a member's gender (Volden, Wiseman & Wittmer 2013), seniority rank on the committee, number of terms served, and whether they are a chair or ranking member of any committee, as longer tenured

¹³The sample extends from the 104th through 114th Congresses, but committee data is available for the 115th which I use to code leaving a committee at the end of the 114th.

members will be less likely to leave a committee (Kellermann & Shepsle 2009, Richman 2008). The committee seniority variable also controls for members who are forced to leave a committee due to party seat losses from an election, as these are the most junior members. The number of terms served is controlled for because nearly 30% of committee departures in the data occur in a legislator's first term, and more than 2/3 occur in a legislator's first three terms. I also control for whether the member belongs to the majority party, and party identification to capture any differing patterns in committee service between the parties (Frisch & Kelly 2004). The models control for the percentage of majority party members on the committee, as there is dispute about the extent to which committees are majority party dominated (Groseclose 1994*b*, Krehbiel 1990, Shepsle & Weingast 1981).

Committee membership rules vary by party and congress, but members usually serve on two committees (one non-exclusive committee and one exclusive committee¹⁴) so that various individual factors (e.g., committee partisanship, rank within committee) vary across committees for the same member. Hence, the units are member-committee seats within congresses with observations nested within committees and congresses. The models are conditional/fixed effects logit for committee selection and binomial logit for committee departure. Committee fixed effects control for all differences across committees and constant across time (e.g., committee type, Grosewart score, etc.) Congress fixed effects control for all heterogeneity across time, such as baseline levels of polarization, party control of Congress, divided government, etc.

Ideological and Partisan Congruence Increases the Probability of Committee Selection

The first set of empirics test whether congruence between the ideology of a lawmaker's district and the partisanship of a committee increases the probability a member will select that committee. To measure the hypothesized relationship, district ideology (measured using both the Kernell measure and presidential vote within the district) is interacted with lagged committee partisanship (measured using the average difference in party voting within the committee, though the results are robust to the other two committee partisanship measures). Lagged committee partisanship is used because members observe the partisanship of the committee in the

¹⁴The parties rank committees slightly differently but as of the 113th Congress, both parties classify committees as "exclusive," "non-exclusive," and "exempt."

previous congress which sets their expectations about the nature of the committee.

Because the results in all models are either fixed effects logit models or binary logit models, the coefficients and statistical significance are not directly interpretable (Brambor, Clark & Golder 2006) and I relegate all coefficient tables to the Appendix. Predicted probabilities for the first set of models in Appendix Table A3 are shown in Figure 1 with the thin gray line showing predicted probabilities of committee selection as committee partisanship increases when district ideology is at its minimum, and the thick black line showing the probability of selection when district ideology is at its maximum. Hypothesis 1 claims that when a district's ideology and the partisanship of a committee are congruent, a member is likely to select that committee.


As the figure shows, when a member comes from a moderate district *and* committee partisanship is low, the probability of selecting any given committee is about .17 (95% CI: .1 to .24), but when a member represents an extreme district and committee partisanship is at its minimum, the probability a member selects the committee is only .08 (95% CI: .07 to .09), or about half of the probability when their district is moderate. For members in extreme districts, the probability of joining the most partisan committee increases to .11 (95% CI: .09 to .12). The marginal substantive increase is much smaller for members in extreme districts because the variable is logged, and these are probabilities for joining any given committee, making these results strongly supportive of the theory.

Other results in Table A3 are consistent with expectations. The member's seniority, either within the party or overall on the committee are not predictive of whether they join the committee. This is likely because the vast majority of committee selection choices occur when a member is new to the institution, thus there is little variation on this variable. The percentage of the committee made up of the majority party also has no effect on the likelihood of joining a committee. Committee-specific characteristics such as its overall value, or its distributive potential are captured by the committee fixed effects.

The Conditional Effect of Committee Distributive Potential

The relationship between ideological and partisan congruence will be positively conditioned by the distributive capacity of the committee. Table A6 interacts the two committee measures of district partisanship (district presidential vote and the Kernell measure) with whether a committee is classified as distributive. This classification is drawn from Deering & Smith

Figure 1: Predicted Probabilities of Committee Choice Conditional on Kernell District Ideology and Average Difference in Committee Partisan Voting



Note: Predicted probabilities from model 1 in Table A3. The left y-axis is the density of the measure of committee partisanship, average difference in partisan voting. The x-axis is committee partisanship from the minimum to the maximum, while the right y-axis is the predicted probability of choosing a particular committee.

(1997) and Frisch & Kelly (2004) who call these committees, “constituency oriented,” and includes: Agriculture, Armed Services, Natural Resources, Transportation and Infrastructure, Science, Space, and Technology, Small Business, and Veterans’ Affairs. To these, I add Appropriations, (the Deering & Smith/Frisch & Kelly classification categorizes Appropriations as a “prestige” committee.)¹⁵

To find the conditional effect for a distributive committee on the relationship between district ideology and committee partisanship, the same conditional logit models are estimated, but the sample is split by distributive and non-distributive committees. While an interaction term between district ideology, partisanship, and committee type would be preferable, committee type is collinear with the committee fixed effects necessary to estimate the conditional logit models. Thus, each of the two models using Kernell district partisanship estimates a member’s likelihood of selecting a committee from among either a distributive committee choice set, or a

¹⁵I also created my own measure which in addition to these committees adds Ways and Means, and Energy and Commerce, and the results are consistent with those shown here.

non-distributive committee choice-set (see Table A6).


The substantive interpretation of the fixed effects logits are conveyed by Figure 2. Members from moderate districts (left panel) have the highest probability of selecting a committee that has low partisanship, and the probability of selecting a committee decreases as committee partisanship increases. The opposite is true for members from extreme districts (right panel), as their probability of committee selection increases as the partisanship of the committee increases. In each of the panels, the thick black line shows the probability of selecting a distributive committee, while the thin gray line shows the probability of selecting a non-distributive committee. In both panels, the probability of selecting a distributive committee is statistically significantly higher than for non-distributive committees at a subset of committee partisanship values near the middle of the scale. The effect is much smaller for members from ideologically extreme districts (note the scale of the y-axis in the right panel is one-half of the left panel), and the predicted probabilities suggest that ideologically extreme members have a higher probability of selecting a distributive committee even if the committee has low to moderate partisanship. At high partisanship, the differences between the types of committees are not statistically significant. These combined results are strong evidence for Hypothesis 2 in that members prefer to serve on ideologically congruent committees which are also distributive.

Robustness Check: Randomization Inference

A common approach to examining whether committees are composed of preference outliers is to randomly reassign legislators to committees, then compare these simulated committee medians or means to observed committees and determine whether there are statistically significant differences between the two. Groseclose (1994*b*) explains why this non-parametric approach is superior when looking for committee outliers; differences between the chamber and committee must be more non-representative than they would be by *chance*. Here, I am not examining whether committees are representative of their parent chamber or not, but whether there is a relationship between district characteristics of members on committees and the committees' inherent partisanship. Are committees made up of congruent members significantly different than would be the case if the committees were simply created from a random draw of all legislators within the chamber?

To conduct the tests, I randomly assign all members to committees within a Congress, estimate the same empirical models, save the coefficients and standard errors, and repeat the

Figure 2: Predicted Probabilities of Committee Choice for Distributive and Non-Distributive Committees, Conditional on Kernell District Ideology and Average Difference in Committee Partisan Voting



Note: Predicted probabilities from model 1 (left panel) and model 2 (right panel) in Table A6. The y-axis is the predicted probability of choosing a particular committee for members with minimum district ideological extremity (left panel) and maximum district ideological extremity (right panel). The right panel y-axis is scaled to be one-half of the left axis panel. The x-axis is committee partisanship from the minimum to the maximum.

process 1,000 times, as recommended by Erikson, Pinto & Rader (2010). If the coefficients and z-scores from the models using the real data are statistically significantly different from the coefficients from the randomized data, there is increased confidence that the results are not due to chance alone. As Erikson, Pinto & Rader (2010) note, inferences should be based on the distribution of test statistics rather than the distribution of coefficients, and this method performs well even in the presences of non-normal error structures (also see Kennedy 1995 and Kennedy & Cade 1996.)

In the graphs in Appendix E, I plot the observed coefficients and the 95% distribution for the randomized set of coefficients, along with observed z-scores and the 95% distribution for the simulated coefficients. Though the models are identical to those run with the real data, for clarity I plot only the key independent variables from each model, the measure of district ideological extremity, committee partisanship, and the interaction between the two.

There are 24 coefficients and z-scores across eight different fixed effects logit models. The randomization inference shows that 19 of the 24 are statistically different than would be expected by chance. Further, a number of the coefficients and z-scores which are not different from a randomly generated value are themselves not statistically significant in the empirical models, as component terms, though importantly, logit coefficients and statistical significance should not be directly interpreted (Brambor, Clark & Golder 2006). On balance, the randomization inference results are strongly suggestive that the observed relationships are different than what would be observed by random chance alone.

Robustness Check: Alternative Model Specifications

Additional alternative model specifications are shown in Appendix C including both mixed and fixed effects regressions with committee partisanship as the dependent variable and district partisanship is the independent variable (Tables A4 and A5 in Appendix C). I also address whether members have “reverse coattails,” whereby they affect presidential vote share within their district because of their committee service. I replicate all results using only members in their first term in office who are least likely to affect presidential vote share within their district. The results for first term members are nearly identical to the results for all members, giving confidence that the results are not due to this source of endogeneity. (Results not shown but code provided in replication file.)

Mismatched Members Are More Likely to Depart Committees

Not only do legislators prefer to serve on committees that have levels of partisanship consistent with the ideological leanings of their districts, the theory also suggests that the decision to change committees will be driven by the degree to which a lawmaker fits their current committee assignment, all else equal. As described in the theory, while misaligned committee assignments should be rare, they may happen for a variety of reasons, including little or poor information on district-committee alignment, a lack of seats available on congruent committees, or due to party leader preferences. Switching committees is very costly, however, and members must carefully calculate whether it is worth the loss of seniority to move to another committee. Departing is most likely for members from marginal or competitive districts, who are sensitive to the preferences of the general electorate and thus more likely to be bear the

costs of switching.

Switching committees is quite rare, with only 937 occurrences of members leaving their committee (15% of total observations). The estimator is binomial logit as the observations are at the individual level (whether a member left their committee or not); fixed effects for committee and congress are used, along with controls for member characteristics.

Table A7 shows three models where the absolute value of a legislator's committee z-score for Kernell district extremity is interacted with three other variables: the vote percentage received by the member in the last election (model 1), Kernell district extremity (model 2), and presidential vote district extremity (model 3). The coefficients are not directly interpretable, so predicted probabilities of leaving a committee taken from the results in model 3 are plotted in Figure 3. The predicted probabilities for each of the models are substantively similar. The left y-axis shows the predicted probability of a committee-member leaving their committee at the end of the congressional term, the right y-axis shows the distribution of presidential vote district extremity, and the x-axis varies the district's level of extremity, with zero values indicating the district is moderate, while high values indicate the district is ideologically extreme.


The thin gray line shows predicted probabilities of leaving a committee when a member is not an outlier on their committee (outlierness is at its minimum). When a member is in a bipartisan district, there is a low probability of switching committee seats because they are well-aligned, ideologically, with the committee, and salient electoral concerns exist. The positive slope indicates that even well matched committee-members might sometimes depart a committee, but only when they represent a safe district and are not likely to be electorally punished for switching.

The thick black line shows predicted probabilities at the maximum observed outlier value in the dataset, for a member with a z-score of 4.6.¹⁶ The probability of a member leaving the committee when an extreme outlier and also representing a moderate district is high, at nearly .3 (95% CI: .15 to .42). Importantly, the probability decreases as the district becomes less moderate and less competitive, supporting Hypothesis 3. Outliers will switch, but only if there are significant electoral disadvantages to serving on a mismatched committee.

Members from safe seats who are not concerned about losing a general election may be concerned about losing a primary election if they are an outlier within their own party on a

¹⁶The member is Ron Dellums CA-9 in the 105th Congress who represented a very ideologically extreme district but sat on the relatively bipartisan Armed Services Committee.

Figure 3: Predicted Probabilities of Committee Departures Conditional on Outlying Preferences and District Partisanship



Note: Predicted probabilities from model 3 in Table A7. The left y-axis is lagged vote district partisanship density, the x-axis is district extremity as measured by the absolute difference between the Democratic presidential candidate national vote share and district vote share. The right x-axis is the predicted probability of leaving a committee conditional on district partisanship and absolute level of outlierness on a committee.

committee. If this were the case, then one would expect outlying party members to be more likely to leave a committee as their presidential vote district extremity increases, the opposite of the effect of that shown in Figure 3. To determine whether the dynamics differ for members on the within-party dimension, I constructed the same Kernell Z-scores, but using only co-partisans on the committee. The results are nearly identical those shown previously, with members representing extreme districts likely to leave moderate committees (as measured only by using co-partisans), and more moderate members more likely to leave extreme committees. This evidence suggests that the party delegations are representative of the broader committee partisanship, and being out of step with one’s party encourages a moderate member to switch committees. The results and marginal effects graph are shown in Appendix Table A8 and Figure A6.

The Conditional Effect of Committee Distributive Potential on Committee Departure

As with committee assignments, members should be less willing to leave a committee, even when mismatched, if the committee offers high distributive benefits. To test Hypothesis 4, I estimate an interaction with three component terms: a member's absolute ideological outlierness on their committee, their presidential vote district extremity, and whether or not their committee is classified as distributive.¹⁷ Because these are logits modeling the decision to leave, I drop the committee fixed effects to allow for estimation of committee type (i.e., distributive or not), and include a committee's Grosewart score to capture its overall value to members.


Table A9 shows each combination of the three way interactions, with each component term equaling the effect when all other terms are zero. Figure 4 shows predicted probabilities of leaving a committee for members of distributive and non-distributive committees at the minimum (left panel) and maximum level of outlierness (right panel). As with the previous results, the probability of leaving is lowest when a member is not an outlier on their committee and is also in a competitive district, and increases when they are not in a competitive district. As the left panel shows, there is no statistically significant difference in the probability these types of members leave a distributive committee as compared to a non-distributive one.

The more interesting case is for members who are ideological outliers on their committee *and* who are also in a competitive seat. Members on both distributive and non-distributive committees are significantly more likely to leave their committee. Additionally, the difference in the probability of leaving the committee for members on distributive and non-distributive committees is statistically significant when the district is competitive. That is, members on distributive committees, even when they are ideological outliers and are in a competitive seat, are about half as likely to leave their committee than similar members on a non-distributive committee. Clearly, serving on a distributive committee can be valuable to a member even if they are not well matched, but serving on a well matched, distributive committee is the most valuable assignment for a member, and one they are not likely to leave.

One possible confounder occurs when a party loses a substantial number of seats in the House. Because the party composition within the chamber changes, seats on committees are redistributed to the parties, and some members may be non-voluntarily removed from their committee assignments. Members are removed based on seniority, controlled for by the se-

¹⁷The results for an interaction using the other measures of district competitiveness, Kernell district extremity, and member vote percentage are very similar.

Figure 4: Predicted Probabilities of Committee Departures Conditional on Outlying Preferences and District Partisanship



Note: Predicted probabilities from model 3 in Table A9. The left y-axis is lagged vote district partisanship density, the x-axis is district extremity as measured by the absolute difference between the Democratic presidential candidate national vote share and district vote share. The right x-axis is the predicted probability of leaving a committee conditional on district partisanship and absolute level of outlierness on a committee.

niority variable in the models, but to ensure this is not driving the results, I sub-sampled the data for only congressional terms in which one party did not lose a significant number of seats. These are the 105th, 106th, 107th, 108th, 109th, and 113th Congresses. The results are robust to only those observations, and the probabilities of leaving a committee increase at high values of district extremity and partisanship (results not shown but included in replication code).

Discussion

Committees differ in their latent level of partisanship; some jurisdictional areas are simply more divisive than others. Members have expectations about the jurisdiction's relative level of partisanship and seek out those committees which allow them to demonstrate their own preferences to their constituents. In short, committee service allows legislators to show that they are either reaching across the aisle to develop legislation with broad support, or it allows them to burnish their partisan credentials. Cross-pressured members from moderate districts seek the former type of committee service, while those from partisan districts seek the latter.

The tests and results use members' electoral concerns to determine which might be most dissatisfied with serving on a non-aligned committee. Electoral concerns are conceptualized as the result of competitiveness at the general election stage, though I also tested whether being an outlier within a member's own party has an effect on leaving a committee. If a representative is out of step with other party members, they may be more likely to leave a committee, especially as their district becomes more ideologically extreme. While there is little evidence for this in the results, future research should examine the relationship between electoral incentives and committee service in greater detail. For example, are outlying members on committees punished by voters, in either their primary or general election contests?

Explanations for the self-selection of lawmakers onto congressional committees has been dominated by distributive theory, which suggests that committees assist members in achieving their reelection imperative by allowing them to distribute particularized goods to their constituents. While the distributive potential of committees remains an important factor, it is not the only aspect of committee service that motivates member selection. Committees are also valuable for their collective and national representation benefits, in addition to individualistic, local concerns. When members use committees to signal ideological representativeness to their constituents, they are doing so across all jurisdictions, and not exclusively for distributive purposes; collective engagement with national policymaking, through committee service, is important for members' electoral prospects. This may be particularly important in an era in which voters and elected officials are increasingly polarized and motivated by partisan attachments.

This is broadly consistent with both partisan and information theories which are largely based on representational appeals, with information theory suggesting members trying to minimize the uncertainty of policy, and partisan theories suggesting members collectively delegate to

leaders to enhance the party brand and ensure collective benefits. I do not adjudicate between them here, but importantly I identify an alternative rationale for committee service that does not rely on the distribution of public goods, but instead on shared, dyadic, ideological or preference based policy outcomes.

This research suggests a rethinking of how committee self-selection occurs and theories of congressional organization. I have made no attempt to determine the extent to which the partisanship on committees reflects partisanship in the chamber, that is whether committees are representative of the chamber *writ large*. This is an important, but complicated question in that some committees might be while some are not, and evidence that there is variation in the levels of committee partisanship is not dispositive. Instead, this research offers a step forward in thinking about the mechanisms behind committee self-selection and ultimately, their implications for theories of congressional organization.

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Appendix A

Table A1: Partisanship in Roll Call Voting on Standing Committees, 104th-114th Congresses

Committee	Avg. Difference in Partisan Voting	SD of Partisan Voting	Avg. Percentage of Low Party Line Votes	SD of Low Party Line Votes	Avg. Percentage of High Party Line Votes	SD of High Party Line Votes	No. of Votes
Agriculture	53.55	23.46	58.43	41.08	10.17	16.02	107
Appropriations	83.32	21.21	92.84	14.63	49.97	26.61	404
Armed Services	64.93	16.05	73.72	14.42	24.66	18.51	275
Financial Services	63.73	14.22	68.18	17.10	30.35	18.55	587
Budget	87.63	16.74	89.42	16.90	71.50	24.24	175
Education and the Workforce	90.45	4.70	93.38	2.82	71.50	12.07	537
Energy and Commerce	77.00	16.82	83.90	19.37	38.93	18.26	817
International Relations	61.90	19.86	70.71	23.18	26.37	31.49	204
Oversight and Government Reform	75.55	31.36	78.36	33.25	52.62	38.12	125
House Administration	95.06	11.26	95.06	11.26	95.06	11.26	75
Judiciary	83.75	6.19	88.58	4.33	55.25	18.33	1361
Natural Resources	77.96	12.89	89.43	10.66	26.51	20.21	498
Transportation and Infrastructure	75.04	20.66	78.13	20.38	41.08	38.11	74
Rules	94.10	8.50	97.51	3.31	81.66	23.30	3182
Science, Space, and Technology	88.30	14.66	92.21	12.98	62.46	35.89	148
Small Business	72.82	27.70	70.24	40.00	35.71	27.85	31
Veterans' Affairs	54.55	26.77	62.22	41.19	18.33	28.58	21
Ways and Means	85.28	7.82	89.18	8.23	62.50	10.50	550
Intelligence (Permanent)	46.61	35.13	46.12	38.28	34.46	30.98	78
Homeland Security	78.64	10.03	81.08	10.93	59.18	18.54	188
Sample Average & Total	85.51	NA	90.30	NA	60.24	NA	9,437

Average difference in partisan voting is equal to the absolute difference between Democrats and Republicans voting “yea” on a given vote, averaged across all votes and across all congresses. Average percentage of low party lines votes is the percentage of votes within a committee, averaged across all congresses, in which greater than 50% of one party voted against 50% of the other party. Average percentage of high party line votes is the same measure using a 95% threshold. The standard deviation of each measure across congresses is also shown.

Table A2 shows each committee’s rank across the three measures of committee partisanship. The final column averages each of the three measures to create a composite partisanship score for each committee, with committees ordered by overall level of partisanship. In the table, House Administration has the greatest difference, on average, between Republicans and Democrats voting “yea” on a given vote, the second highest percentage of low party votes, and the highest percentage of high party votes. Its average across all three measures is 1.33, meaning it is the most partisan committee in the dataset.

Table A2: Rank Ordering of Standing Committees by Three Measures of Partisanship, 104th-114th Congresses

Committee	Rank Order of Committee Based on...			Avg. Rank Ordering Across Measures	Std. Dev. of Ranks	Range of Ranks
	Avg. Difference in Partisan Voting	Avg. Percentage of Low Party Line Votes	Avg. Percentage of High Party Line Votes			
House Administration	1	2	1	1.33	3.91	12
Rules	2	1	2	1.67	3.52	13
Education and the Workforce	3	3	3	3.00	1.69	5
Science, Space, and Technology	4	5	6	5.00	3.99	11
Budget	5	7	4	5.33	5.99	15
Ways and Means	6	8	5	6.33	3.38	9
Appropriations	8	4	10	7.33	4.10	14
Judiciary	7	9	8	8.00	2.01	7
Homeland Security	9	11	7	9.00	3.70	9
Natural Resources	10	6	16	10.67	2.43	7
Energy and Commerce	11	10	12	11.00	2.70	10
Oversight and Government Reform	12	12	9	11.00	5.65	17
Transportation and Infrastructure	13	13	11	12.33	5.85	14
Small Business	14	16	13	14.33	5.09	11
Armed Services	15	14	18	15.67	2.09	7
Financial Services	16	17	15	16.00	2.81	9
International Relations	17	15	17	16.33	4.42	14
Intelligence (Permanent)	20	20	14	18.00	5.92	18
Veterans’ Affairs	18	18	19	18.33	2.88	7
Agriculture	19	19	20	19.33	3.98	12

The table shows the rank ordering of each committee across the three measures of committee vote partisanship. See Table A1 for more details on each measure. Column four is an average of the rank order of each committee on the three measures, from most partisan to least partisan. The rows are ordered by level of partisanship, with House Administration being the most partisan committee and Agriculture being the least partisan committee.

Appendix B: Relative Partisanship of Committee Memberships in Committee and on the Floor, 104th through 113th Congresses

In the figures below, each committee is ordered from least to most partisan based on the average difference in party voting *within the committee*, and moving left to right on the x-axis indicates that the committee has larger average difference in party voting. The vertical bars represent the *difference* between the committee value for average difference in party voting and the chamber difference, or:


$$\begin{aligned} \text{Differences in party voting between committee and chamber} = \\ \text{Party difference for committee } j \text{ in congress } k - \\ \text{Party difference for committee } j \text{ membership in congress } k \text{ on House floor votes} \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

Where the party difference for the membership of committee j in congress k on House floor votes is the sum of the absolute values of percentage of Democratic committee membership voting yea minus the percentage of Republican committee membership voting yea divided by the total number of House floor votes.¹⁸ If the bar is below zero, it indicates that the committee membership voted, on average, in a more bipartisan manner on the committee than they did on the floor. As the bar approaches 100% a committee's membership is more partisan relative to its membership's voting behavior on the floor.

Members on the least partisan committees are also much less partisan within the committee as compared to their voting behavior on the floor, while on the most partisan committees, members vote in a much more more partisan manner as compared to their behavior on the floor. (The results for all other congresses are similar, figures are shown below.) The result is that members on bipartisan committees appear much more moderate compared to their chamber behavior, while the opposite is true for for members on partisan committees, whose voting behavior in committees appears much more extreme compared to their voting behavior within the chamber, which serves as a measure of the baseline partisanship within the congressional term.


¹⁸This is the identical to the construction of committee party differences shown in Equation 1 but using the committee membership's House floor votes instead of committee votes.

Figure A1: Relative Committee Partisanship as Compared to Floor Partisanship—114th Congress




Note: X-axis orders committees from least to most partisan in members' voting behavior. Negative values indicate committee membership was less partisan in committee voting as compared to floor voting, zero represents no difference in partisanship in committee voting as compared to floor voting, positive values indicate committee membership was more partisan in committee voting as compared to floor voting.

Figure A2: Relative Committee Partisanship as Compared Floor Partisanship—104th-107th Congresses




Note: X-axis orders committees from least to most partisan in members' voting behavior. Negative values indicate committee membership was less partisan in committee voting as compared to floor voting, zero represents no difference in partisanship in committee voting as compared to floor voting, positive values indicate committee membership was more partisan in committee voting as compared to floor voting.

Figure A3: Relative Committee Partisanship as Compared Floor Partisanship—108th-111th Congresses



Note: X-axis orders committees from least to most partisan in members' voting behavior. Negative values indicate committee membership was less partisan in committee voting as compared to floor voting, zero represents no difference in partisanship in committee voting as compared to floor voting, positive values indicate committee membership was more partisan in committee voting as compared to floor voting.

Figure A4: Relative Committee Partisanship as Compared Floor Partisanship—112th-113th Congresses



Note: X-axis orders committees from least to most partisan in members' voting behavior. Negative values indicate committee membership was less partisan in committee voting as compared to floor voting, zero represents no difference in partisanship in committee voting as compared to floor voting, positive values indicate committee membership was more partisan in committee voting as compared to floor voting.

Appendix C: The Relationship Between District Partisanship and Committee Partisanship

Table A3: Fixed Effects Logit Estimates of Committee Assignments

	(1)	(2)
Choice-Specific Variables		
Logged Kernell District Ideology	-0.11* (0.04)	
Logged Presidential Vote District Ideology		-0.10 (0.07)
Lagged Avg. Diff. in Committee Partisan Voting	0.14# (0.07)	-0.17 (0.19)
Committee Party Seniority Rank	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Committee Overall Seniority	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)
Alternative-Specific Variables		
Maj. Party Percent of Committee Seats	0.01 (0.34)	-0.01 (0.32)
Logged Kernell District Extremity x Lagged Avg. Diff. in Committee Partisan Voting	0.15* (0.07)	
Logged Pres. Vote. District Extremity x Lagged Avg. Diff. in Committee Partisan Voting		0.11 (0.09)
Constant	-1.91* (0.31)	-1.65* (0.36)
Committee Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Congress Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
AIC	44872.05	45136.57
N	71,576	71,991
Cases	7,090	7,132

Note: * $p < .05$, # $p < .1$. Models are fixed effects logit with standard errors clustered by committee, where the dependent variable is selecting a committee from a constrained choice set of committees. Cases indicate unique number of member-committee-congress observations. Choice-specific variables are those that vary by individuals, alternative-specific variables are those that vary across the choice-set (committees).

Table A4 shows a mixed effects regression model where committee partisanship is the dependent variable (as measured by the average absolute difference in Republicans and Democrats voting “yea” on all roll call votes taken within the committee within a congress) and district partisanship is the independent variable. Observations are member-committee seats with varying intercepts for Congress and a set of control variables at the member and committee level are included. The coefficients for both measures of district partisanship are positive and significant at the .1 level, supporting the theory that members seek committees which match their district ideology. For Kernell district extremity, increasing from the minimum to the mean extremity results in a committee assignment that is 25% more partisan as measured by average absolute difference between Republican and Democratic voting (90% CI: .2% to 53%). The results in model 2 for district presidential vote partisanship are similar. Table A5 estimates the same model using fixed effects.

Table A4, Robustness Check: Mixed Effects Estimate of District Partisanship on Partisan Committee Membership Using Average Difference in Percentage of Each Party Voting Yes

	(1)	(2)
Member-Level Predictors		
Logged Kernell District Partisanship	0.33 [#] (0.19)	
Logged Presidential Vote District Partisanship		0.34 [#] (0.19)
Committee Party Seniority Rank	-0.08* (0.03)	-0.09* (0.03)
Gender (Female=1)	0.22 (0.59)	0.17 (0.59)
Majority Party Member (Yes=1)	0.49 (0.62)	0.61 (0.62)
Member Party (Dem.=1)	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)
Chair or Ranking Member of Any Committee	-0.22 (0.62)	-0.27 (0.62)
Committee Overall Seniority	-0.18* (0.08)	-0.18* (0.08)
Committee-Level Predictors		
Maj. Party Percent of Committee Seats	31.45* (6.43)	31.73* (6.42)
Grosewart Committee Value	-1.37* (0.31)	-1.38* (0.31)
Policy Committee	5.47* (0.49)	5.37* (0.49)
Prestige Committee	16.03* (0.71)	15.97* (0.71)
Constant	55.53* (4.29)	54.23* (4.30)
Random Effects Parameters		
Congress Var.	46.46 (20.03)	46.07 (19.86)
Residual Var.	312.17 (5.05)	311.91 (5.04)
Wald Chi-squared	791.95 (p<0.00)	795.05 (p<0.00)
AIC	65649.79	65995.12
N	7,641	7,682

Note: *p<.05, [#]p<.1. The dependent variable is the average absolute difference in percentage of each party voting “yea.” Kernell district ideology uses the Kernell measure of district partisanship while Presidential Vote District Partisanship uses the absolute difference between the Democratic presidential candidate national vote share and district vote share. Committee categories are taken from Frisch and Kelly (2004), constituent committees excluded. Models are mixed effects regression nested by congress.

Table A5, Robustness Check: Regression of District Partisanship on Partisan Committee Membership—Average Difference in Percentage of Each Party Voting Yes

	(1)	(2)
Logged Kernell District Partisanship	0.32 [#] (0.19)	
Logged Presidential Vote District Partisanship		0.34 [#] (0.20)
Committee Party Seniority Rank	-0.08* (0.03)	-0.09* (0.03)
Gender (Female=1)	0.20 (0.57)	0.15 (0.58)
Majority Party Member (Yes=1)	0.48 (0.63)	0.60 (0.63)
Member Party (Dem.=1)	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.01)
Chair or Ranking Member of Any Committee	-0.20 (0.62)	-0.26 (0.62)
Committee Overall Seniority	-0.18* (0.07)	-0.18* (0.07)
Maj. Party Percent of Committee Seats	30.68* (6.55)	30.96* (6.54)
Grosecart Committee Value	-1.37* (0.25)	-1.38* (0.25)
Policy Committee	5.47* (0.50)	5.37* (0.50)
Prestige Committee	16.05* (0.73)	16.00* (0.73)
Constant	51.58* (3.72)	50.27* (3.72)
AIC	65603.64	65949.00
R-Squared	0.22	0.22
N	7,641	7,682

Note: * $p < .05$, [#] $p < .1$. The dependent variable is the average absolute difference in percentage of each party voting “yea.” Kernell district ideology uses the Kernell measure of district partisanship while Presidential Vote District Partisanship uses the absolute difference between the Democratic presidential candidate national vote share and district vote share. Committee categories are taken from Frisch and Kelly (2004), constituent committees excluded. Models are mixed effects regression nested by congress.

Appendix D: The Conditional Effect of Distributive Committees

Table A6: The Conditional Effect of Distributive Committees on District Partisanship and Partisan Committee Membership


	Non-Distributive Committees	Distributive Committees
	(1)	(2)
Choice-Specific Variables		
Logged Kernell District Ideology	-0.07 (0.09)	-0.12* (0.03)
Committee Party Seniority Rank	-0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Committee Overall Seniority	-0.06# (0.03)	-0.03 (0.05)
Alternative-Specific Variables		
Lagged Avg. Diff. in Committee Partisan Voting	0.27* (0.08)	0.05 (0.07)
Maj. Party Percent of Committee Seats	-0.07 (0.38)	-0.20 (0.48)
Logged Kernell District Extremity x Lagged Avg. Diff. in Committee Partisan Voting	0.15 (0.13)	0.08 (0.10)
Constant	-1.44* (0.37)	-1.99* (0.50)
Committee Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Congress Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
AIC	25460.91	19334.09
N	44,473	27,103
Cases	3,893	3,197

Note: * $p < .05$, # $p < .1$. Models are fixed effects logit with standard errors clustered by committee, where the dependent variable is selecting a committee from constrained choice set of committees. Model 1 is sub-sampled only for non-distributive committees, model 2 is sub-sampled only for distributive committees. Groups are individual members of Congress with fixed effects for congressional term. Cases indicate unique number of member-committee-congress observations. Choice-specific variables are those that vary by individuals, alternative-specific variables are those that vary across the choice-set (committees).

Appendix E: Randomization Inference


As described in the text, I conduct randomization tests to determine whether the observed relationships between district ideological extremity and committee partisanship could be due to random chance alone. The concern is that because there are a limited number of members and committees, even random assignment of members to committees could produce the observed results. Randomization inference is one way to test whether the observed coefficients are statistically different from coefficients that would be produced if one could observe the random assignment of members to committee.

Figure A5: Randomization Inference: Fixed Effect Logit Estimates of Committee Assignments




Note: Observed coefficients and 95% distribution of simulated coefficients from randomized committee memberships. Coefficients are for selected independent variables.

Figure A5 (cont.): Randomization Inference: Fixed Effect Logit Estimates of Committee Assignments




Note: Observed coefficients and 95% distribution of simulated coefficients from randomized committee memberships. Coefficients are for selected independent variables.

Figure A5 (cont.): Randomization Inference: Fixed Effect Logit Estimates of Committee Assignments Separated by Distributive and Non-Distributive Committees



Note: Observed coefficients and 95% distribution of simulated coefficients from randomized committee memberships. Coefficients are for selected independent variables.

Figure A5 (cont.): Randomization Inference: Fixed Effect Logit Estimates of Committee Assignments Separated by Distributive and Non-Distributive Committees



Note: Observed coefficients and 95% distribution of simulated coefficients from randomized committee memberships. Coefficients are for selected independent variables.

Appendix F: Predicting Committee Departures

Table A7: The Conditional Effect of Outlying Preferences on Committee Departure

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Member Outlierness (Kernell Z-Score)	0.43 (0.33)	0.17 (0.15)	0.25* (0.11)
Committee Party Seniority Rank	0.05* (0.01)	0.05* (0.01)	0.05* (0.01)
Gender (Female=1)	0.04 (0.10)	0.07 (0.10)	0.08 (0.10)
Majority Party Member (Yes=1)	0.12 (0.14)	0.06 (0.14)	0.07 (0.14)
Member Party (Dem.=1)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Chair or Ranking Member of Any Committee	-0.35* (0.13)	-0.31* (0.15)	-0.31* (0.15)
Number of Terms Served	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.05# (0.03)	-0.05# (0.03)
Member Vote Percentage	0.01# (0.01)		
Z-Score x Vote Percentage	-0.01 (0.00)		
Kernell District Partisanship		0.07 (0.18)	
Z-Score x Kernell Extremity		-0.13 (0.12)	
Presidential Vote District Partisanship			0.01# (0.01)
Z-Score x Pres. Vote District Partisanship			-0.02* (0.01)
Constant	-2.62* (0.55)	-2.18* (0.30)	-2.24* (0.30)
Committee Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Congress Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R-Squared	0.15	0.15	0.15
N	6115	6789	6789


Note: * $p < .05$, # $p < .1$. Models are logit with standard errors clustered by committee, where the dependent variable is whether the member left committee i in congress j . The sample is limited to members in their first four terms. Member outlierness is the absolute value of a member's z-score for the committee-congress on which they serve using the Kernell district ideology measure.

Table A8: The Conditional Effect of Outlying Party Preferences on Committee Departure

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Member Party Outlierness (Kernell)	0.76* (0.36)	0.28* (0.13)	0.33* (0.10)
Committee Party Seniority Rank	0.05* (0.01)	0.05* (0.01)	0.05* (0.01)
Gender (Female=1)	0.03 (0.10)	0.06 (0.10)	0.07 (0.10)
Majority Party Member (Yes=1)	0.12 (0.14)	0.08 (0.14)	0.08 (0.14)
Member Party (Dem.=1)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Chair or Ranking Member of Any Committee	-0.35* (0.13)	-0.31* (0.14)	-0.31* (0.14)
Number of Terms Served	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.05# (0.03)	-0.05# (0.03)
Member Vote Percentage	0.01* (0.01)		
Party Z-Score x Vote Percentage	-0.01 (0.00)		
Kernell District Partisanship		0.17 (0.16)	
Party Z-Score x Kernell Extremity		-0.23* (0.11)	
Presidential Vote District Partisanship		0.02#	(0.01)
Party Z-Score x Pres. Vote District Partisanship		-0.02*	(0.01)
Constant -2.85*	-2.25* (0.59)	-2.28* (0.29)	(0.32)
Committee Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Congress Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R-Squared	0.15	0.15	0.15
N	6106	6780	6780

Note: * $p < .05$, # $p < .1$. Models are logit with standard errors clustered by committee, where the dependent variable is whether the member left committee i in congress j . The sample is limited to members in their first four terms. Member outlierness is the absolute value of a member's z-score for the party-committee-congress on which they serve using the Kernell district ideology measure.

Figure 5: Predicted Probabilities of Committee Departures Conditional on Party Outlying Preferences and District Partisanship



Note: Predicted probabilities from model 3 in Table A8. The left y-axis is lagged vote district partisanship density, the x-axis is district extremity as measured by the absolute difference between the Democratic presidential candidate national vote share and district vote share. The right x-axis is the predicted probability of leaving a committee conditional on district partisanship and absolute level of outlierness on a committee.

Table A9: The Conditional Effect of Outlying Preferences on Committee Departure

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Member Outlierness (Kernell Z-Score)	0.87 [#] (0.48)	0.31 [#] (0.18)	0.43* (0.17)
Distributive Committee	0.50 (0.74)	-0.42 (0.34)	-0.39 (0.28)
Committee Party Seniority Rank	0.03* (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)
Gender (Female=1)	0.05 (0.10)	0.09 (0.10)	0.10 (0.10)
Majority Party Member (Yes=1)	0.20 (0.14)	0.16 (0.14)	0.17 (0.13)
Member Party (Dem.=1)	0.0002 (0.001)	0.0002 (0.001)	0.0002 (0.001)
Chair or Ranking Member of Any Committee	-0.46* (0.12)	-0.43* (0.14)	-0.43* (0.14)
Grosewart Committee Value	-1.70* (0.16)	-1.59* (0.17)	-1.60* (0.18)
Maj. Party Percent of Committee Seats	2.10 (1.80)	1.89 (1.64)	1.90 (1.65)
Number of Terms Served	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.08* (0.03)	-0.08* (0.03)
Z-Score x Distributive Comm.	-0.74 (0.63)	-0.16 (0.27)	-0.17 (0.20)

Table continued on next page

Table A9 Continued

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Member Vote Percentage	0.02* (0.01)		
Z-Score x Vote Pct.	-0.01# (0.01)		
Distributive Comm. x Vote. Pct	-0.01 (0.01)		
Z-Score x Vote Pct. x Distributive Comm.	0.01 (0.01)		
Kernell District Partisanship		0.09 (0.22)	
Z-Score x Kernell Extremity		-0.18 (0.11)	
Distributive Comm. x Kernell Extremity		0.07 (0.37)	
Z-Score x Kernell Extremity x Distributive Comm.		0.002 (0.22)	
Presidential Vote District Partisanship			0.02 (0.01)
Z-Score x Pres. Vote Dist. Extremity			-0.02* (0.01)
Distributive x Pres. Vote Dist. Extremity			0.003 (0.02)
Z-Score x Pres. Vote. Dist. Extremity x Distributive Comm.			0.001 (0.01)
Constant	-4.11* (1.50)	-2.93* (1.14)	-3.06* (1.16)
Congress Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R-Squared	0.14	0.14	0.14
N	5954	6612	6612

Note: * $p < .05$, # $p < .1$. Models are logit with standard errors clustered by committee, where the dependent variable is whether the member left committee i in congress j . The sample is limited to members in their first four terms. Member outlieriness is the absolute value of a member's z-score for the committee-congress on which they serve using the Kernell district ideology measure.